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Was Glass-Steagall’s Demise Inevitable and Unimportant? 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. (September 15, 2018) 
The financial crisis of 2007-09 caused the Great Recession, the most severe global 
economic downturn since the Great Depression.  The financial crisis began with the collapse of 
the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. and spread to financial markets around the world.  
Similarly, the disastrous financial events of the Great Depression began with the Great Crash on 
Wall Street in October 1929 and spread throughout the U.S. and Europe during the early 1930s.1 
Congress responded to the Great Depression by passing the Glass-Steagall Banking Act 
of 1933.  Two of Glass-Steagall’s key provisions – Sections 20 and 32 – separated commercial 
banks from the capital markets.  As discussed below, Congress repealed Sections 20 and 32 in 
1999, after a prolonged period of erosion during the 1980s and 1990s.  The recent financial crisis 
has revived popular interest in Glass-Steagall, given the similar boom-and-bust cycles that led to 
the Great Depression and the Great Recession.  The Democratic and Republican party platforms 
in 2016 called for a return to Glass-Steagall’s principles, and the issue has resurfaced again 
during the 2018 midterm election campaign.2 
The Glass-Steagall Act transformed the U.S. financial industry after it collapsed during 
the Great Depression.  Section 8 established a new system of federal deposit insurance to prevent 
1 This essay was originally published in Columbia Law School’s The CLS Blue Sky Blog on September 18, 2018 
(available at http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/09/18/was-glass-steagalls-demise-both-inevitable-and-
unimportant/).  The analysis in this essay is drawn from my forthcoming book on the Glass-Steagall Act.  Portions 
of that analysis appear in two of my articles: “Prelude to Glass-Steagall: Abusive Securities Practices by National 
City Bank and Chase National Bank During the ‘Roaring Twenties’,” 90 Tulane Law Review 1285 (2016) 
[hereinafter “Prelude to Glass-Steagall”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2828339, and “The Road to Repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act,” 17 Wake Forest Journal of Business & Intellectual Property Law 441 (2017) [hereinafter 
“Road to Repeal”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3026287. 
2 Victoria Finkle, “Is Glass-Steagall posed for a political comeback?”, American Banker (Sept. 10, 2018), available 
at https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/is-glass-steagall-poised-for-a-political-
comeback?utm_campaign=bankthink-c-
Sep%2010%202018&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&eid=12a6d4d069cd56cfddaa391c24eb7042. 
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depositor “runs” on banks.  Sections 20 and 32 separated commercial banks from the capital 
markets.  Section 21 reinforced that separation by prohibiting nonbanks from accepting 
deposits.3   
A central purpose of Glass-Steagall was to prevent banks from financing speculative 
securities booms like the one that occurred during the 1920s.  During the “Roaring Twenties,” 
large U.S. banks created securities affiliates and operated as “universal banks.”  Universal banks 
helped to finance an unsustainable credit bubble during the 1920s by packaging risky domestic 
and foreign loans into hazardous bonds that were sold to investors across the U.S. and around the 
world.  Universal banks also helped to promote an equally unsustainable bubble in the U.S. stock 
market by selling speculative stocks to unsophisticated purchasers.  Universal banks were at the 
center of major financial crises that erupted in the U.S. and Europe during the early 1930s.4   
The Glass-Steagall Act (together with other New Deal legislation) established a 
decentralized financial system composed of separate and independent sectors.  Commercial 
banks accepted deposits, extended loans, and provided fiduciary services (including wealth 
management and investment advice) to consumers and businesses.  Securities firms attracted 
longer-term funding commitments from investors and arranged medium-term and longer-term 
financing for businesses.  Insurance companies collected premiums from consumers and 
businesses and provided medium-term and longer-term coverage for various types of risks.  The 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) reinforced Glass-Steagall’s policy of structural 
separation by (1) preventing commercial or industrial firms from affiliating with banks, and (2) 
                                                 
3 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 449-50. 
4 See generally Wilmarth, “Prelude to Glass-Steagall,” supra note 1. 
3 
 
prohibiting nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies from engaging in activities that 
were not “closely related to banking.”5 
The system of segmented financial sectors established by Glass-Steagall and the BHC 
Act prospered from the end of World War II through much of the 1970s.  During that period, no 
major financial crisis occurred.  An important reason for that era’s financial stability was that 
problems arising in one sector of the financial markets were much less likely to have a 
contagious impact on other sectors.  Regulators could address financial problems with targeted 
responses that did not require massive bailouts of the entire financial system.  Federal courts at 
first defended Glass-Steagall, as they struck down several attempts by large banks and federal 
regulators to open loopholes in the statute from the late 1960s through the early 1980s.6  
The post-New Deal system of financial regulation experienced a series of economic 
disruptions and legal challenges after 1970.  The economic shocks included the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates for international currencies as well as high 
inflation rates that rose steadily during the 1970s and peaked in 1980.  Those events put great 
pressure on Regulation Q, another aspect of Glass-Steagall’s reforms.  Regulation Q prohibited 
banks from paying interest on demand deposits and limited the interest rates that banks could pay 
on savings accounts and certificates of deposit.  Regulation Q was intended to restrain deposit-
rate competition among banks and thereby discourage the kind of excessive risk-taking that 
banks exhibited during the 1920s.7    
                                                 
5 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 450-52; see also Prasad Krishnamurthy, “George Stigler on His 
Head: The Consequences of Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation,” 35 Yale Journal on Regulation 823, 
825, 841-43 (2018). 
6 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 452-53; see also Krishnamurthy, supra note 5, at 825.  For examples 
of court decisions upholding Glass-Steagall, see, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 
468 U.S. 137 (1984); Investment Co. Instit. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & 
Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
7 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 450-51, 456-58; see also Krishnamurthy, supra note 5, at 836-43, 
846-47. 
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Some scholars have argued that the collapse of Bretton Woods and the high inflation 
rates of the 1970s destroyed the economic foundations of Glass-Steagall.  Professor Paul 
Mahoney has provided a detailed account of that position in a recent article.  Professor Mahoney 
also contends that Glass-Steagall was undermined by the emergence of financial innovations like 
money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”), short-term commercial paper, short-term securities 
repurchase agreements (“repos”), securitization, and over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives.  
MMMFs, short-term commercial paper, and short-term repos allowed securities firms to offer 
bank-like products to consumers and businesses.  Securitization and OTC derivatives permitted 
banks to offer financial services that competed directly with securities firms and insurance 
companies.  Professor Mahoney concludes that Glass-Steagall was effectively a dead letter by 
1999, when Congress repealed its key provisions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).8   
I agree with Professor Mahoney that economic disruptions and financial innovations 
posed serious threats to the viability of Glass-Steagall.  However, I do not agree that Glass-
Steagall’s demise was an inevitable outcome.  I contend that industry participants exploited 
market forces by mounting attacks on Glass-Steagall, and federal agencies and courts helped 
them to do so. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) allowed securities firms and asset 
managers to create MMMFs in the early 1970s.  MMMFs provided the functional equivalent of 
bank deposits by permitting customers to redeem their investments on demand at a fixed net 
asset value (“NAV”) of $1 per share.  The $1 fixed NAV represented a dramatic – and I believe 
unlawful – departure from basic principles governing mutual funds under the Investment 
                                                 
8 Paul G. Mahoney, “Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis,” 104 Virginia Law Review 235 (2018).  For other 
scholars who have presented similar arguments, see Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal, supra note 1, at 444 n.7 (citing 
works by Jerry W. Markham, Peter J. Wallison, and Lawrence J. White). 
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Company Act of 1940.  For mutual funds that are not MMMFs, fund managers must redeem a 
customer’s investment based on the (variable) equity value of his or her investment on the date 
of redemption.  The SEC took another radical step by allowing MMMFs to offer check-writing 
features that turned MMMFs into functional substitutes for bank checking accounts.  The Federal 
Reserve Board (“Fed”) could have blocked that step by prohibiting banks from clearing checks 
for MMMFs.  However, the Fed did not do so. 
In 1979, the Bowery Savings Bank of New York filed a complaint with the Justice 
Department and the SEC, alleging that MMMFs with check-writing features violated Section 21 
of the Glass-Steagall Act.  Based on a highly formalistic analysis, the Justice Department ruled 
that MMMFs were equity investments rather than “deposits,” and their check-writing features 
did not change their fundamental nature.  The Justice Department therefore advised the SEC that 
MMMFs did not violate Section 21’s prohibition on the acceptance of deposits by nonbanks.  
The Justice Department (and the SEC) ignored the fact that MMMFs competed directly with 
bank deposit accounts and provided the functional equivalent of checking accounts.  After 
receiving this green light from regulators, the MMMF industry quickly grew from $3 billion in 
1977 to $235 billion in 1982.9 
The rapid expansion of MMMFs and the corresponding outflow of deposits from banks 
provided a convenient rationale for Congress to repeal Regulation Q – a result that federal 
regulators and many bankers welcomed.  MMMFs continued to grow because they enjoyed 
important cost advantages over banks.  MMMFs did not have to pay deposit insurance premiums 
or maintain capital buffers similar to those required for banks.  The total assets held by MMMFs 
increased to $740 billion in 1995, $1.8 trillion in 2000, and $3.8 trillion in 2007.   
                                                 
9 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 458-60. 
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As MMMFs grew, so did the market for commercial paper, a short-term debt instrument 
(usually with maturities of 90 days or less) issued by nonfinancial corporations and financial 
firms.  MMMFs were the largest investors in commercial paper.  The volume of outstanding 
commercial paper grew from $50 billion in 1975 to $560 billion in 1990, $1.3 trillion in 2000, 
and $2 trillion in 2007.   
MMMFs were also very important cash lenders for repos.  Repos are short-term loans 
(frequently with terms of one to several days) secured by pledges of securities.  Like commercial 
paper, repos expanded in tandem with the growth of MMMFs.  The total volume of repos entered 
into by securities broker-dealers increased from $110 billion in 1981 to $800 billion in 1990, 
$2.5 trillion in 2002, and $3.5 trillion in 2007.  The short-term funding provided by MMMFs, 
commercial paper, and repos fueled the growth of the “shadow banking system.”   MMMFs, 
commercial paper, and repos served as “shadow bank deposits” and allowed securities firms and 
other nonbank financial companies to compete directly with banks in providing credit to 
consumers and businesses.10   
Morgan Ricks has persuasively argued that the rapid growth of “shadow bank deposits” 
after the mid-1980s represented “an increasing privatization of the broad money supply in the 
pre-crisis years.”  MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos functioned as substitutes for bank 
deposits because they were debt instruments that were effectively payable at par on demand (or 
with very short notice).  In addition, federal regulators and Congress provided favorable 
treatment for those instruments, including “safe harbors” that exempted them from restrictions 
imposed on most creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.  The favored status of MMMFs, 
                                                 
10 Id. at 460-62. 
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commercial paper, and repos caused many investors to consider them as being just as “safe” as 
bank deposits.11   
Nonbanks and large, bank-centered financial conglomerates relied heavily on “shadow 
bank deposits” during the credit boom of the 2000s.  That reliance exposed major financial 
institutions to severe liquidity problems in 2007 and 2008, when investors engaged in large-scale 
“runs” on MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos.  To prevent a collapse of the financial system, 
the Treasury Department, Fed, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provided guarantees, 
asset purchase programs, and liquidity facilities that functioned as de facto deposit insurance for 
all three types of “shadow bank deposits.”12   
The market forces that undermined Regulation Q did not compel policymakers to stand 
by while nonbanks offered deposit substitutes that violated Section 21 of Glass-Steagall.  Federal 
regulators and Congress could have removed or relaxed Regulation Q’s restrictions on deposit 
interest rates – thereby allowing more favorable returns to depositors – while prohibiting 
nonbanks from offering financial instruments that served as de facto deposits.  A realistic, 
functionally-grounded interpretation of Section 21 would have barred nonbanks from offering 
MMMFs, short-term commercial paper, and short-term repos.  Unfortunately, regulators did not 
choose to prohibit those instruments and did not require securities firms and other nonbank 
financial companies to fund their operations in a more stable and transparent manner by issuing 
longer-term debt securities and entering into term loans with banks.13  
                                                 
11 See generally Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (2016) (quote at 36); Anna 
Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, “Inside Safe Assets,” 33 Yale Journal on Regulation 363 (2016). 
12 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 462-64; see also Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Res. 
Bank of N.Y. Working Paper, July 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337. 
13 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 462; see also Krishnamurthy, supra note 5, at 846. 
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 ********************************************************   
   The other two financial “innovations” that undermined Glass-Steagall – securitization 
and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives – developed along similar story lines that included 
regulatory arbitrage and regulatory sponsorship.  Like MMMFs, securitization and OTC 
derivatives were not the result of unstoppable market forces.  Instead, they were actively 
encouraged and promoted by federal regulators who wanted to break down Glass-Steagall’s wall 
of separation between the banking industry and the capital markets.   
In 1987, the Fed took the first major step by allowing bank holding companies to 
establish “Section 20 subsidiaries.”  The Fed permitted those subsidiaries to engage (to a limited 
extent) in underwriting mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, municipal revenue 
bonds, and commercial paper.  The Fed ruled that Section 20 subsidiaries did not violate Section 
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act because they were subject to numerous Fed-imposed restrictions.  In 
view of those restrictions, the Fed determined that Section 20 subsidiaries were not “engaged 
principally” in underwriting or dealing in bank-ineligible securities and, therefore, did not violate 
Section 20 of Glass-Steagall.   
The Securities Industry Association challenged the Fed’s Section 20 order.  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the Fed’s order would help to “dismantle the wall of 
separation” established by Glass-Steagall.  However, the court concluded that it was required to 
defer to the Fed’s interpretation of an “ambiguous” statute under the Supreme Court’s 1984 
decision in Chevron.  The Second Circuit stated, “Whether [George] Santayana’s notion that 
those who will not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it fairly characterizes the 
consequences of the [Fed’s] action is not for us to say.”  The Second Circuit’s allusion to 
Santayana’s oft-quoted warning was tragically prescient, but it unfortunately did not alter the 
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court’s highly deferential approach.  Under Chairman Alan Greenspan’s leadership, the Fed 
steadily removed the restrictions on Section 20 subsidiaries and expanded the scope of its 
Section 20 loophole between 1987 and 1996.14  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) followed the Fed’s example by 
allowing national banks to securitize residential mortgages and other loans directly (instead of 
being required to use holding company affiliates).  The OCC’s efforts were part of that agency’s 
intense competition with Alan Greenspan’s Fed for the position of deregulator-in-chief for the 
banking industry.   
In 1987, the OCC issued an order confirming the authority of national banks to securitize 
residential mortgages.  The Securities Industry Association promptly challenged that order.  As it 
had done with the Fed, the Second Circuit deferred to the OCC’s view that national banks could 
securitize loans without violating Glass-Steagall.  The Second Circuit concluded that investors in 
mortgage-backed securities would be adequately protected by the securities laws.  The court 
agreed with the OCC that purchasers of mortgage-backed securities would be “informed 
investors” with “full disclosure” of all “material facts” about the “underlying loans.”  The court 
also concurred with the OCC’s opinion that national banks would be “unlikely” to securitize 
“unsound loans.”  Those assumptions by the OCC and the Second Circuit proved to be 
completely wrong.  The financial crisis revealed that bank underwriters of mortgage-backed 
securities did have financial incentives to securitize hazardous loans, and did not provide 
investors with full disclosure about the quality and risks of the underlying mortgages.15  
                                                 
14 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 468-73 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), and Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 
U.S. 1059)). 
15 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 473-76 (discussing Sec. Indus. Ass’ n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d 
Cir. 1989)). 
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By 1999, when Congress repealed Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall, banks had 
already underwritten $900 billion of mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed 
securities.  Following Glass-Steagall’s repeal, the volume of outstanding mortgage-backed 
securities and other asset-backed securities underwritten by banks increased to $5 trillion by 
2007.  Securitization of nonprime mortgages and other high-risk loans fueled the toxic credit 
boom that led to the financial crisis of 2007-09.  Securitization by banks could not have occurred 
prior to 1999 without a prolonged campaign of successful litigation that was financed by major 
banks and supported by friendly regulators.16 
OTC derivatives were the third major “innovation” that broke down Glass-Steagall’s 
barriers.  OTC derivatives enabled banks to offer synthetic securities and synthetic insurance 
products to their customers, in much the same way that “shadow bank deposits” allowed 
securities firms and other nonbanks to offer bank-like products to their clients.  As Saule 
Omarova has documented, the OCC followed a prolonged, step-by-step process that allowed 
national banks to offer a wide range of OTC derivatives.   
National banks first offered interest rate swaps and currency rate swaps, which grew out 
of their traditional activities of discounting debt obligations and exchanging foreign currencies.  
The OCC drew analogies from those swaps and developed a steadily expanding concept of “the 
business of banking,” which rationalized orders permitting national banks to deal in equity swaps 
and commodity swaps.  The OCC subsequently authorized national banks to offer credit default 
swaps (CDS), which provided the equivalent of insurance against defaults on loans and debt 
securities.   
                                                 
16 Id. at 476-77. 
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The OCC and the Fed ruled that banks could reduce their capital requirements by 
obtaining CDS protection for their loans from AIG and other insurance companies.  CDS from 
insurance companies also enabled banks to create collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  CDOs 
were second-level securitizations based on pools of unsold mortgage-backed securities.  CDS 
from insurance companies supported decisions by credit ratings agencies to issue “AAA” ratings 
for CDOs.  The nonprime mortgage boom could not have reached its massive size without the 
crucial roles played by CDOs and CDS.  Without CDOs, many lower-rated mortgage-backed 
securities would have remained unsold, and funding for nonprime mortgages would have dried 
up.  Without CDS, banks could not have obtained the “AAA” credit ratings they needed to sell 
CDOs to investors. 
By 2007, there were $58 trillion of outstanding CDS, and some estimates indicate that a 
third of those CDS represented bets on the performance of nonprime mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, and CDOs.  AIG and the other insurance companies that issued CDS were not 
required to hold any reserves for those CDS because state insurance commissioners had no 
authority to regulate CDS.  The vast pyramid of bets created by CDS and CDOs magnified the 
losses that occurred when borrowers defaulted on their nonprime mortgages.17 
 ******************************************************   
I agree with Professor Mahoney that Glass-Steagall’s wall of separation eroded 
significantly prior to its repeal in 1999.  As shown above, federal agencies and federal courts 
opened a number of loopholes in the legal barriers that separated banks from the securities and 
insurance sectors during the 1980s and 1990s.  However, those loopholes were subject to many 
                                                 
17 For discussions of CDS and other OTC derivatives, see id. at 477-91; Saule T. Omarova, “The Quiet 
Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking’,” 63 University of Miami Law Review 1041 
(2009). 
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restrictions and did not allow banks to establish full-scale affiliations with securities firms and 
insurance companies.  Leaders of the largest banks needed two major pieces of legislation to 
achieve their goal of creating full-service universal banks. 
First, the big-bank lobby needed to repeal Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act 
and modify Section 4 of the BHC Act.  Those three provisions prevented banks from creating 
unrestricted affiliations with securities firms and insurance companies.  Large banks and their 
trade associations pursued a 20-year campaign to accomplish that objective.  Their campaign 
gained significant momentum in 1997 and 1998, when securities broker-dealers and insurance 
underwriters finally joined big banks in pushing Congress to authorize financial holding 
companies that could own all three types of financial institutions.  However, community banks 
and insurance agents continued to defend Glass-Steagall. 
To overcome the remaining pockets of resistance, Alan Greenspan’s Fed issued a 1998 
order allowing Travelers, a big securities and insurance conglomerate, to acquire Citicorp, the 
largest U.S. bank.  President Bill Clinton and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin publicly endorsed 
the creation of “Citigroup” – the first U.S. universal bank since 1933.  The Fed approved the 
acquisition by relying on a temporary exemption in the BHC Act, which allowed newly-formed 
bank holding companies to divest nonconforming activities within 2-5 years.  As one banking 
lawyer noted, that temporary exemption was “intended to provide an orderly mechanism for 
disposing of impermissible activities, not warehousing them in hopes that the law would change 
so you could keep them.”18  
The creation of Citigroup confronted Congress with a Hobson’s choice – either repeal the 
anti-affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall and the BHC Act or force Citigroup (a $1 trillion 
                                                 
18 Wilmarth, “Road to Repeal,” supra note 1, at 512-14 (quoting Barbara A. Rehm, “Megamerger Plan Hinges on 
Congress,” American Banker (April 7, 1998), at 1 (quoting an unnamed banking lawyer)). 
13 
 
financial conglomerate) to break up within five years.  The Citigroup deal put a gun to the head 
of Congress, and it did so with the blessing of the President and the two most important financial 
agency leaders.  As Jeff Madrick observed, Citigroup’s creation was “a stark example of the ease 
with which the powerful on Wall Street got the ear of key policymakers, and how easily the Fed, 
through its rulings, could bypass the intentions of Congress.”19   
Citigroup spearheaded the final assault on Glass-Steagall, a campaign fueled by $300 
million of political contributions and lobbying expenditures.  Advocates for repeal called on 
Congress to clear away the “costly” and “unstable” loopholes created by federal agency and 
court rulings, and to provide a definitive legal framework for unrestricted affiliations among 
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.  In November 1999, Congress passed GLBA, 
which repealed Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall and modified Section 4 of the BHC Act.  
Senator Phil Gramm declared, “We are here to repeal Glass-Steagall because we have learned 
that government is not the answer.”  As President Clinton signed GLBA into law, he stated that 
“we have done right by the American people.”20   
The financial lobby’s second major legislative goal was to insulate OTC derivatives from 
substantive regulation by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).  
During the 1990s, the ability of banks and securities firms to offer OTC derivatives depended on 
a tenuous exemption approved by the CFTC in 1993.  CFTC chairman Brooksley Born tried to 
reconsider that exemption in 1998, but she was blocked by the derivatives lobby and the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 514-15 (quoting Jeff Madrick, The Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 
to the Present 313 (2011)). 
20 Id. at 515-18 (quoting statements by congressional supporters of GLBA, as well as Sen. Gramm and President 
Clinton) 
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vigorous opposition of Fed chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin, and SEC chairman 
Arthur Levitt.21 
The Treasury, Fed, and SEC continued to push for a sweeping deregulation of OTC 
derivatives despite the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) in 1998.  
LTCM was a big hedge fund with massive derivatives exposures that suffered devastating losses 
after Russia’s debt default in August 1998.  The Fed prevented a potentially serious disruption of 
the financial markets by persuading a group of large banks and securities firms to rescue LTCM.  
The LTCM debacle vividly illustrated the dangers of unrestrained speculation in derivatives.22   
Unfortunately, the LTCM crisis proved to be the canary in the coal mine, or the tree 
falling in the forest, that advocates of “financial modernization” were determined neither to see 
nor hear.  In November 1999, the President’s Working Group on Capital Markets – including 
Rubin, Greenspan, and Levitt – recommended legislation that would broadly exempt OTC 
derivatives from federal and state regulation.  The Working Group argued that comprehensive 
deregulation was needed to remove “legal uncertainty” and “provide a permanent clarification of 
the legal status” of OTC derivatives.23 
Armed with the Working Group’s recommendation, the derivatives lobby and its political 
supporters persuaded Congress to enact the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) 
in December 2000.  The only major question was how far-reaching the deregulation of OTC 
derivatives would be.  Senator Gramm led the successful effort to exempt OTC derivatives from 
all types of substantive regulation under federal and state laws as long as the counterparties to 
those instruments were financial institutions, corporations, institutional investors, or wealthy 
                                                 
21 Id. at 524-29, 534. 
22 Id. at 530-33. 
23 Id. at 533-39 (quoting the Working Group’s report issued in November 1999). 
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individuals.  Gramm declared that CFMA “completes the work of [GLBA]” and “protects 
financial institutions from over-regulation.”  He left the Senate in 2002 and became vice 
chairman and a registered lobbyist for UBS, a giant Swiss universal bank.  UBS suffered more 
than $50 billion of losses during the financial crisis and was forced to accept a large bailout from 
the Swiss government in the fall of 2008.24     
 ******************************************************   
As the foregoing summary indicates, GLBA and CFMA were highly consequential laws.  
They enabled banking organizations to become much larger and more complex and engage in a 
far broader range of activities.  They transformed the U.S. financial system from a decentralized 
system of independent financial sectors into a highly consolidated industry dominated by a small 
group of giant financial conglomerates.   
I disagree with Professor Mahoney and other scholars who contend that GLBA and 
CFMA did not play important roles in promoting the toxic credit boom that led to the financial 
crisis of 2007-09.  Those scholars argue that GLBA and CFMA merely ratified what federal 
regulators and courts had already done, prior to 1999, by permitting nonbank financial 
institutions to offer “shadow bank deposits,” by allowing banking organizations to engage in 
securitization, and by enabling both types of institutions to offer OTC derivatives.   
I agree that regulators and courts opened loopholes that seriously weakened the structural 
barriers established by the Glass-Steagall and BHC Acts.  However, those loopholes rested on 
highly contestable legal interpretations and could have been reversed by either regulators or the 
courts.  Supporters of GLBA and CFMA argued that both statutes were urgently needed to 
remove burdensome restrictions and provide “legal certainty” for a deregulated regime of 
                                                 
24 Id. at 539-41 (quoting Sen. Gramm); Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, “A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed,” 
New York Times (Nov. 17, 2008), A1. 
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universal banking.  The big-bank lobby secured passage of GLBA and CFMA after prolonged 
campaigns that cost hundreds of millions of dollars.  Those campaigns would not have occurred 
unless big banks and their trade associations viewed both statutes as highly important. 
One very tangible way to confirm the significance of GLBA and CFMA is to see how 
quickly the U.S. financial industry changed after they were enacted.  GLBA’s first major 
dividend was to validate Citigroup’s universal banking structure – a result that allowed Citigroup 
to remain intact.  During 2000, Credit Suisse and UBS capitalized on GLBA by acquiring two 
large U.S. securities firms (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and Paine Webber).  Another 
immediate benefit was that GLBA permitted large bank holding companies to convert their 
limited Section 20 subsidiaries into full-service securities broker-dealers.  As one federal 
regulator noted in 2000, “Loopholes cost money. . . . A top bank told me [GLBA] was a major 
boost to their bottom line.”25  GLBA enabled banking organizations to triple their share of the 
U.S. corporate debt underwriting market from 25% in 1998 to 75% in 2003.  The number of 
banking organizations that ranked among the top-five underwriters of U.S. corporate debt rose 
from zero in 1996 to four in 2003.26 
A second indication of GLBA’s and CFMA’s significance is the explosive growth that 
occurred in the shadow banking, securitization, and derivatives markets between 2000 and the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007.  The volume of outstanding MMMFs increased from 
$1.8 to $3.8 trillion, while commercial paper grew from $1.3 trillion to $2 trillion, and repos at 
broker-dealers rose from $2.5 trillion to $3.5 trillion.  Mortgage-backed securities and other 
asset-backed securities (including CDOs) expanded from $1.6 trillion to $5 trillion, while OTC 
                                                 
25 Id. at 543 (quoting Barbara Rehm, “No Merger Wave, But Money Saved,” American Banker (Nov. 7, 2000) 
(quoting an unnamed federal regulator)). 
26 Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, “Regulation and Deregulation in the US Banking Industry,” in Nancy L. 
Rose, ed., Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? 485, 499-500 (2014).  
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derivatives mushroomed from $95 trillion to $673 trillion.  It is very unlikely that such dramatic 
growth would have occurred in all of those markets without the comprehensive deregulation 
authorized by GLBA and CFMA. 
Glass-Steagall’s demise was not inevitable, and its disappearance had highly important 
and devastating consequences.  The same financial “innovations” that helped to erode Glass-
Steagall – shadow banking deposits, securitization, and OTC derivatives – ultimately fueled the 
toxic credit boom and created the unstable financial conditions that led to the crisis of 2007-09.  
Had Glass-Steagall remained intact, I believe the financial crisis might not have happened, and it 
certainly would have had a much less severe impact if it did occur.  I therefore agree with 
Professor Kathryn Judge’s suggestion that we need to consider both “market forces” and “legal 
changes” as we evaluate whether it was a wise policy decision to repeal Glass-Steagall (or to 
allow it to be undermined by federal agency rulings and court decisions).27  
    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Kathryn Judge, “Regulation and Deregulation: The Baseline Challenge,” 104 Virginia Law Review Online 101 
(2018). 
